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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
~1ARY

.JANE 0. KLOEPFER
'
Plaintiff and Appella1d,
vs.

Case No.
12179

CONT1NEKTAL ASSrRAKCE
CO:\lPANY,
[)efn/d((/it rrnd n!'.'-/>lldcnt.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT,
COXTIXENT AL ASSURANCE COMP ANY

NATURE OF

THI1~

CASE

Plaintiff claims that the life of her deceased husband was in:--urPd h~· defrndant at the time of her hnsliand 's dPath on April 11, 19G8. Defendant denies the
c-lairn and maintains, ( l) that the effective date of the
polie~· 'ms clc>arly and unambiguously declared by tlw
policy's terms to be May 1, 1968 and (2) assuming argue>rnlo that the effective date of the policy as agreed to by
the parties could have preceded Kloepfer's death, the
policy does not provide insurance coverage for his death
he>cause the required premium was not paid nor the requirement of payment waived.
1
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DISP081TlOX IX THE LUWER corRT
Tht> cast> was hPard in tlw lowPr ('ourt on .:\lotions
by both partiPs for 8mnmar:· ,JnJgrnPnt. JfasPd upon
tlw stipulations of thP partiPs, writt(•n 11H•rnorandmus
presented to the rourt and argm1wnts, the court Pntt>rt•d
JUdt,'1m·nt in favor of clefrnclo.nt, hol<ling that fop plaintiff's clec<'asecl lrnshand \ms not insun•d Jn· <l(·frnclant at
the timP of his cleatli.

RELIEF SOFOHT OX APPEAL
Defendant-Rt>spondt>nt, Contirn•ntal ,\ssuranc<' Coll!pany, seeks affirmance of tlw judg11wnt of thP low<>r
rourt.

STATEMEN'l OF FACTS
1

For the purpost>s of rlaril'ication, thP <lPf(·mlant
wishes to highlight two assPrtions in thP plaintiff's ;;.;tatPment of facts with which it particular!)' disagT<'t'S. First,
although the relationship of Eldon Jos<'ph Kloepfor to
thP Kloepft>r Construction Company is iwither rt>vPah·d
by tht> record nor relPvant to this action, defrn<lant lwlievPs that thP deceasPd owm•cl at l<'ast thP rnajorit:·
interest and perhaps all the interest in the prosperous
Kloepfer Construction Company. Second, plaintiff has
misconstrued the policy evidenced by Exhibit D. The
policy itself statei:-; that the sole principals thPreto are
the defendant and the National Aeronautic Ai:-;soeiation.
The record re>vt>als that Eldon .Joseph Kloepfer by
an application dated March 30, 19GS applied for insurance coveragP 11nd(-lr a group lifr immraneP ])Olicy then
2
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m effoct lwtwPc·n thP dPf<>ndant anrl the National Aero1iautie Assoeiation. limrwdiatel~' ahove the deceased's
signatm·p appParwl thP following:
S. I ht·rPhy appl>· to C'Ot\TTNENTAL ASCOMP ANT for insnrance nndPr

~rRAXC'E

Group Lif<' lwmra11ce Policy iss11ed to the N11tio11nl .Aeronautic Associatio11 of which I am a
11a·mher. I agrPe that the ahovP answPrs arP cornplPtP and true to tht> hest of rnv
knowlPd<rp
and
•
r:i
lwlit>f. I 1wdersfr/ild thut this ii1s1tra11cc shull
co111e effecti1·e ollly i11 accordailcc irith the procisio11s of s11ch Gro11p Policy. (Emphasis added)
(Ex. C; Rt>cord p. 16)

ue-

Th<· applieant diPd in tlw crash of a privat<> plane
late i11 the evening of April 11, 1968. (Tr. p. 261, 11.19-20).
On April 11, 1968 the group policy administrator,
( 'harlPs 0. Finlt'y & Company, Ine., mailed to the applic·ant an 011velope containing a letter (Ex. A; Record p. 3),
a ('!·rtifieatP of lnsnrane<' (Ex. B: RPCord p. 4) and a
Xoti(·P of Pn·mium (Ex. E; Record p. 68).
At thP top of tht' first page of the Certificate of
I nsmarn·(•, tlit• 1iartit"s to tlw group life policy as well as
tlH· poli<'~· whosp tenn1-1 eontrolled were idPntified in this

Ia ngnagP :
C'<·rtificat<c• of Insurance issued under the terms
of Gronp Lift' Insurance Policy No. L 25949 insurirw
thP ~frmb<c•rs of National Aeronautic Associan
tion. (Ex. B; Record p. 4)
TlH~ group policy rpfrrn·d

to in hoth dect>ased's appli-

<·ation and in thP C<'rtifieat<· of Insurance was Group

3
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Life Insurance Polie.'· Xo. L :25~)-!9 issm•d to First Xational Bank of .Jiimwapolis, TrnstP(' of thP Xational
~\eronautic Association (J roup [nsm·ane(' Trust. (Ex.
D ; Record pp. 17 -43)
The group polic.'» at PagP LP 5;19~~)6 aG (R+>conl p.
30) 8pecifies the date8 at which coverage ma>· com11wncc·
for individuals to be insurPd nnd1c·r tlw group polic)- in
this language :
Each Individual eligible for insnram·1· h(•n·under who makes writte>n request to tlH· Policyholder, on the Company's forms, to partiripatt> in
the insurance under this polic>·· and makes thP
required payment of premium, if an», shall lwcome insured subject to the following eonditions:
(A) Each 8Uch Individual rnnst furnish,
without expense to the Company, P\·idPnee
of insurability satisfactory to it lwfore }w
may become insured. If snch PvideneP is submitted, and payment of the required pri·minrn
made, if any, the Individual's insurance slwlJ
become effective on the first of the insurance
month coinciding with or ne.rt succeedinq the
date the Company determines the evidence to
be satisfactory. (Emphasis added)
The reference date from which in8urancP months
shall hr eomputPd is stated in the group policy at Page
LP 53936 G (Record p. 23) as follows:
This policy shall be effectivt> from 12 :01 a.111.
Standard Time, at the Polic>·holder's address. 011
the 1st day of December, 1966, which date shall be
its date of issue, for a term of one year, from
which date all insurance months and years shall
be computed. (Emphasis added)
4
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The letter of April 11, 1968 addressed to the appli('ant from tliP .~dministrator of the National Aeronautic
.\:~'-'nciation <lroup Lifr Insurance Program, consistent
\l'ith th(• effrctive clatt> polie~· provisions quoted above,
inforn1<·d tlw ap1Jlicant that the compan~· had as of that
<la~e cletermined the evidence of insurability to be satisfactory and that coverage under the group policy became
dfrctin ~la~· 1. 19<iS. (Ex. A; Record p. 3) The Certifi('ah· of Insnrane<• also stated in hold print in th<:> upper
ldt hand eornt>r of the first page that the eff PctivP dateo
was )i[a~· 1, 196S. (Ex. B; RN·ord p. 4)
Looking nm\· to the proYisions concerning payment
of' prernil~m, dPC'eased's application in bold print on a
rP<1 haekground immediately b€'neath applicant's signattff" stated as follows:
PLEASE DO NOT ENCLOSE CHECK
'VITH THIS APPLICATION - A STATE~IEKT \VILL BE ENCLORED \VITH YOUR
POLICY. (Ex. C; Record p. 16)

ThP group policy requires premiums to h<:> paid m
adyanc<· in this language:
12 PAYMENT OF PRT~l\IIUMS
Premiums shall he pa~rable at tht> Home
Offict> of the Company or to a duly authorized
agent of the Company in exchang~ for the Company's receipt signed by the Pres1dent or. Secretarv and countersigned by the Agent designated
the~ein. Premiums are payable annually in advance but with the consent of the Company may
be paid semi-annually, quarterly or monthly in
advanct> in accordance with the Schedule of Rates
contained hf'rein. (Ex. D, p. LP 53936 G-6; Record
p. 36)

5
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Thf' prt>mimn notice rnailPd to deeeased on A~pril 11,
19G8 statf'd that th<:' premium due datf' was )ifa.Y 1, 191)8.
(Ex. E; Record p. 68)
Even the plaintiff has admitt<>d that pa.''1nrnt of tl11•
premium was a condition of tht' policy which had to lw
satisfied before the covf'rage wonld he in t>ffect. (Tr. p.
15, I. 28; p. 16, 11. 28-30)
As for a gracf' period on the pa)11wnt of Jll'Plllinrn
both the Certificate of Insurance mailed to d<>e(•asPd and
the group poliey contain the following langnagP:

A grace period of thirty-on!-' cla:·:-, without
interest charge, shall be granted for tlH· pPriocl of
every premium, after the first, during \\·hieh j)('l'iod the insurance shall continue in fore(•, hut in
case of a claim during such grace period, an:· onrdue premium will be deducted from th<· amount
of insurance in settlement. (Ex. D, p. LP 5;)9:ili
G-6; Record p. 36: Ex. B ; Record p. 5)
The only premium tendPred to tht> def Pndant hnein
was by a check dated l\Iay 7, 19GS ap1waring in Ex. K
(Record p. 68), which cht>ck was rnailPd to thP gr01l)l'
poliey Administrator and reef'ived som<'tirnt- aftPr ~[a:"
7, 19GS. Tlw dt>fendant refmwd tlw tPnd<'r.
ARGUMEN11
POINT I
THE TERM "INSURANCE MONTH" AND OTHER
TERMS CONCERNING THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF
COVERAGE UNDER THE GROUP POLICY ARE
CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND HENCE THE
DECEASED APPLICANT IS BOUND THEREBY.

6
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Tlw plaintiff's claim that tlw t('rrns concerning the
(•ffretin· datP of COYPrag(• arp amhignon8 is not supported
Ii;. tlH· faets. Th(' term "in8urance month" is used
thrnughout hoth the Certificak of Insurance (E~x. B;
H<·eord JllJ. -t-12) mailed to the de-ceased and the Group
Li fr IrnmrancP Policy, Number L 25949 (Ex. D; Record
pp. 17-+8) with its meaning clearly declared in the group
policy itself, for on page LP 63936 G, the front page
of the group policy (Record p. 23), the term "insurance
rnonth'' is dPfined thusly:
This policy shall Ji,, effectin' from 12 :01 A.M.
~tandard Tirnt>, at tht> Polic:·holder's address, on
the 1st day of December, 19fl6, which date shall
bt> its date of issne, for a term of one :·ear, .from
u'hich date all insurance years and months shall
l;c compided. (Emphasis added)
This language clearl:· indicates that the term "insurance month'' means any one month period beginning on
tlw sarnt> cla:· on whirh the qroup policy became effective
which in this particular i)olicy happened to coincide with
tllP first day of th<' ralendar month.
I<~xarnination

of hoth the Certificate (Ex. B) and
thP Group Polic:· (Ex. D) reveals that both are basic
fonns which haYe been adapted for use in the particular
}JOlicy herP at issuf>. The term ''insurance month" was
oh\·ionsly usPd throughout these documents to concisely
<·x1n·pss the ahoYe statf>d concept of an insurance month.
rrhis analysis of the provisions of the controlling
group policy reveals that the meaning of the term "insurance month'' is clear and unambiguous.
7
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This court has affirmed the princivl(' fu11<lanw11tal
to contract law that contracting varties will }w held to
their clear and understandable language deliberately
eommited to writing and endorsed by them as signatories
thereto. 1
In J.llofrad v. New York Life l11s. Co., 20G F.2d .JDl
(10th Cir. 1953), the following principle was ennnciat<•<l:

... 'A contract of insurance n•sb upon nnd
is controlled by the same principle of law applicable to any other contract. ·what the contracting
parties intended, mutually agreed to, and their
minds met upon is the measure of their obligations.' [citations omitted] And if the intentions
of the parties are clear from an examination of
the contractual documents this court will not rewrite the contract. 2
Applying the principle here, according to the ckar
and unambiguously expressed intent of the policy's provisions the effective date had to be May 1, 1968, rather
than April 1 or April 11. Because of the clear meaning of
these }ffovisions this court may not construe the provisions to mean otherwise.
POINT II
THE APPLICANT AND THE DEFENDANT HAD
THE POWER TO DETERMINE THE EFFECTIVE
DATE OF INDIVIDUAL COVERAGE. THE DEFENDANT HAD A LEGAL DUTY TO CLEARLY
SPECIFY THE EFFECTIVE DATE AND DID NOT
ACT ARBITRARILY IN SO DOING.
]ensen's Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Utah 2d 276, 323 P.2d 259 (1958).
206 F.2d 491, 493; Accord: Jones v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
69 Utah 172, 253 Pac. 200, 202 (1927); White v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 63 Utah 272, 224 Pac. 1106, 1108 (1924).
1

2

8
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1'he Utah Supreme Conrt ha::-; repeatedly held that
Ji;~rties to an insnranc<~ IJOlic.\· ma.\· provide in an applica'(ion at what tiirn• and under what conditions a policy is
to become effective and hinding. 3
JrnlePcl, rtaJ1 law now n•quires tltat Pach policy
i :--::-:nt>d shall specify "the time at which the insurance
t hrreunder takes effect. . .. '' 4 Thus, not only are the
ptrtit>s to an insnranct> policy permitted to determint>
'J1p effretin date of the policy hut under the law of this
stat<• th<~ polie.\· must state the effective time.

ln the instant eas<', boti1 the group policy and the
C'<>rtificat<, of Insurance set forth the first day of an
insmaneu month as the only date npon which the insurance could takP effect. Paragraph 2 of the General Provisions on page LP 53936 aG of the group policy states
a~ follows:
Each individual eligible for insurance hereunder who makes written request to the policyholder, on the Company's forms, to participate in
the insurance under this Policy, and makes tlw
required pa_\'ment of premium, if any, shall becomf> insured subject to the following conditions:
(A) Each such Individnal must furnish.
without expense to the Company evidence
of insnrability satisfactory to it before he
may become insured. If such evidence is submitted, and payment of the reqitircd premium
made, if any, the lndi11idual's insu,rance slwll
become effective on the first of the insurance
month coinciding with or next succeeding the
Jjones v. New York Life Ins. Co., 69 Utah 172, 254 Pac. 200,
202 (1927); White v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 63 Utah 272,
224 Pac. 1106 (1924); Sterling v. Lodge, 28 Utah 505, 80 Pac. 375
(1905).
4§ 31-19-11 (2) (e) Utah Code Annotated 1953.

9
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date the company detennines the evidence to
be satisfactory. (Record p. 30)

Similar language referring to tlH• fin;t of an msm·ance month as the effodiYe date for eoverage under
certain circumstances is found on the front pagt> of tlw
Certificate of Insurance. (Ex. B; Record p. 4)
Since, as explained in POINT I above, there is no
ambiguity in the meaning of the term "insurance month,"
it is clear that this provision states that there are only
twelve dates every year when coverage under the grouv
policy may bt>gin for individuals newly admitted to the
group, i.e., the same day of the month as the day when
the basic group policy took effect, which in this case
was the first day of the calendar month. Furthermore,
unless the date of the company's determination that the
applicant's insurability is satisfactory coincides with one
of the twelve possible effective dates, then coverage may
not commence on the day of approval but shall be postponed until the next succeeding possible effective date
- which in the instant case was May 1, 1968.
Upon analysis it is clear that the defendant's deh>rmination of the effective date of coverage was in strict
accord with both the policy's express terms and Utah
law and not arbitrary as asserted by the plaintiff.

10
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POINT III
A VALID PREREQUISITE CONDITION OF THE
GROUP POLICY REQUIRED THAT THE PREMIUM
BE PAID BEFORE THE POLICY COULD BECOME
EFFECTIVE.

Tlwn' is case law too numerous to cite exhaustively
·which applies the principle that when an insurance policy
sets forth conditions which must be met before it beeonws effective those conditions must be satified before
tlw policy may take effect.
The following cases are illustrative of this principle:
In lVhitr -i· •.Metropolitan Life l11s. Co., 63 Utah 272,
224 Pac. 1106 (1924), the insurance policy provided that
t11e policy would not take effect until the application had
been ''received, approved and the policy issued and delivered and the full first premium stipulated in the policy
}1as actually been paid to and accepted by the company4
during the lifrtirne of the life proposed." There the
application had been apprOYPd and the policy delivered
to the agPnt and payment of the premium tendered to
the agent. However, the agent refused to accept the
liremium upon learning that the applicant was ill. The
applicant subsequently diPd. The Utah court held that
the clause requiring that the premium had to be accepted
hy the company gave it the right to rt>fuse to accept
paymPnt and that the applicant was therPfore not in:,:nred.

In lllofrad v. New York Life Ins. Co., s11pra, an
Tranian citizen studying at B.Y.U. was killed in an auto-

11
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mobile accident after having completed and delivered
an application for life insurance and ha\·ing paid the first
premium. The applicant diPd before thf' prerequisitP
medical examination had lwen taken. ThP conrt lH•ld
that there was no insurance contract between thP parti(•,:
since the prerequisitP condition had not lwen met.

In New Enqland lllutual Life Ins. Co. of Boston r.
Hinkle, 248 F.2d 879 (8th Cir. 1%7), the deceasPd had
completed and delivered to the irnmrance compan;.·':-;
agent an application and even paid the first qnart<>r
premium on a lifr insurancP poli<·;.· bPfon" 11e ',rn:-; kilh•d
in an airplant> crash. Tlw polic;.· n•qnired a 11wdin1l
<·xamination satisfactory to the company before the policy would be effecti\·e. The df'ceasPd had not had a nwdical examination. The court held that the prerequisitP
condition of a medical examination had not been satisfied
so, therefore, the deceased's life was not insured.
As quoted in defendant's StatemPnt of Facts, thP
group policy required that individual coverage would
not become effective until tlw cornpan~· had deterrninPd
that thf' evidence of insurability was satisfactory and
tlw prf'rnium had been paid. Only when those prerequisite conditions had been met could coverage become effeetive on the first of the next succeeding insurance month.
No payment was tendered to defendant or its agent
until sometime after May 7, 1968. This breach of the
prepayment of premium requirement is of itself snfficiPnt to support the District Court's judgment.

12
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POINT IV
THERE WAS NO GRACE PERIOD APPLICABLE
TO THE FIRST PREMIUM.

Plaintiff by a tortuous and completely illogical construction of the English language claims that paragraph
13, on page LP 53936 G-6 of the General Provisions of
the group policy, referring to a grace period of "thirtyone days ... after the first" refers to the first of the
insurance month.
N onnal rules of English construction require one to
find tlw noun reference of the adjective "first" within
the sentence in which it is used. Applying that rule, which
i::s buttressed by common sense, one can see that that
1iaragraph simply provides that after the payment of
the fir.~d premium there shall be a grace period of thirtyone days for the pa)71Ilent of any succeeding premiums.
This conclusion is firmly supported by comparing
the language in question with the language of U.C.A.,
~ 31-23-8, which provides as follows:
31-23-8. Grace period.-The group life insnrnce policy shall contain a provision that the polic)·holder is entitled to a grace period of thirty-one
days for the payment of any premium due PJ:;cept
the first, during which grace period the death
benefit coverage shall continue in force, unless
the policyholder shall have given the insnre-r written notice of discontinuance and in accordance
with the terms of the policy. The policy may provide that the policyholder shall he liable to the
insurer for the payment of the prorata premimn
for the time the policy was in force during such
grace period. (Emphasis added) 5
5

Cf. ~ 31-22-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
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Tlw grollp polic:·'s grace period proYision eornpliPs
in substantiv<'ly id<>ntical lanµ;nagt' with the grace period
required by Utah la"·· No'.dl<'l'<' in tlw Ftah stat11tPs is
there any reference to a first of an insurance month.
Nnrely the plaintiff does not claim that the word ''first"
as in tlw statutory phrase "exePpt tlw first" refers to
a first of an i usu rru1cr' m ontl1 !
Assuming, arguendo, the grace period was applicahl<·
to payment of the first premium, plaintiff's own reasoning seeks to establish the effective date as April 1, 1968,
which would make the duP datP l\Iay 1, 1!Hi8. Tlw check
tendered by plaintiff was dated l\Iay 7, 1968 and not
received by defendant until several days after l\Iay 7,
19GS and thPrefore was fatally untimel:· to plaintiff's
claim even accepting plaintiff's premise.
As diseussed in POINT III, the contractual prerequisite condition that the policy premium be paid before thL•
policy could beconw effective is Yalid and binding.
The policy prm1iurn was not tender<'d to defendant
until more than three w<:>eks aftf'l' the date of the applicant's demise and at lPast one week after the premium
due date of l\Iay 1, 1968. rriw principles discussed in
POINT IIT declarP that this failnn' alon<' is sufficient
to support thP District Court's ruling.
POINT V
THE DOCTRINE OF WAIVER IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS SITUATION.

As a gPneral rule, the doctrinP of waiver, both as
to eff1::•ctiye date and as to pa:·rnent of JH'eminm, is

14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

utilized in contractual rnatfrn; only when a varty does
not specifi!'ally
. state the (•ffect intenckd bv. his act. One
a uthori t>· stafrs this pr inc~i pie as follows:
... [I] 11 the alJsencc of anything :;aid or done
lJy the insurer's agcut wheu ddivcri11g the policy
relative to tlw postponement of the effecti,·e date
thereof, it becomes valid at that time regardlt•ss
of the fact that the insured may die the following
day. (Emphasis added) 6
However, here tht• eompany agent clParly indicated
111 the letkr aeeompanying the Certificate of Insurance
and on tlw Certifieate of Insnranee that coverage under
the group policy was not to take effect until May 1, 1968.
Fnrtlwnnon', recall here the discussion in POINT I
of tlw Ftah case;-; 1d1ich unequivocally establish that
parties to an insurance agrPPment may agree upon the
('ffectiw date of the policy. If this court were to find a
waiver of t-ither the payment of premium requirement or
the stated effeetive date of .May 1, this would be in effect
a rnling that not\\·ithstanding an>·thing said or done by
(•itlwr party to an>· insurance contract, the effective date
of any insmanee poliey wonld be as a matter of law the
date upon which it is delivered to the insured. Such
a ruling would be directly contrary to both the established
Jaw of Ptah and the general prineiple on waiver quot€'d
above. Nor is then' any sound reason why this general
rule should be established. No public poliey requires the
Pstahlishment of sueh a rule.
Plaintiff eites the ease of Loftis r. Pacific .:lhttual
Life Ins. Co., 38 Utah 532, 114 Pac. 134 (1911) to support
6Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 138.
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his statement that an insurer may waive its right to a
prennum.
The facts in the Loftis case wen· these. The deceasl•d
was covered under a group policy then in effect and two
premium payments had been paid by payroll deduction
from dPceased's check. The policy provided that if tlw
premium for any particular period wen• not paid, coyerage m1der the group policy would lapsP. By agreement,
the only permitted method of payment was payroll dPduction. At the due date of the next pn'mium, tlw
deceased had not earned Pnough to cover thl' premium,
hence it was not paid. On the following due date, the
defendant insurance company notified the employer of
the amount of prPmium then due on deceased's insuranc('
who just recently had been killed. \Yhen the employer
tendered the premium the insurance company by then
having learned of the death refused the premium and
claimed thl' policy had lapsed. Tlw insurance company
had accepted thP premiums on othPr li,·ing employees
under otherwise identical circumstances, i.e., past duP
premiums due to inadequate earnings and subsequent
billing of the employer by the insurance company for
the past due premiums. Those facts were submitted to
tl1P jury, who found a waiver. On appeal, the defendant
urged that as a matter of law there was no waiver. This
court affirmed the district court on the grounds that a
waiver may be found if a course of conduct by the company or authorized agent induced a reasonably founded
and honest belief that strict compliance with the policy
provisions would not be insisted upon. Note that this
rnle is consistent with the rules relied on by defendant.
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Unlike the Loftis case, the parties here precisely
stated when and under what conditions the policy was to
take effect. There was never expressed any intent to
waive either the requirement that the premium be paid
prior to the insurance hecoming effective or the stated
effective date of l\iay 1, 1968. Indeed, the express intent
was clearly to the contrary.
Relative to the payment of the prPmium, the application (•ompleted by applicant specifically provided that
no premium was to he enclosed in the application. The
elt>ar implication being that a notice of premium would
be sent lati"'r if the company accepted the applicant. En('losed in the same envelope with the Certificate of Insurance and the letter stating tlw dfective date of the policy
to be May L 1968, was a Notice of Premium indicating
that the premium was due May 1, 1968. The defendant
contends that undt>r tl1t'se circumstances for this court
to hold that there was a waiver would totally disregard
the right of the parties to contract and totally disregard
their intent as cl<:>arly expressed in the documents in eYidence before the court.
Finally, this court in Jones v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 69 Utah 172, 253 Pac. 200, 203 (1927), a situation
identical in all relevant and material respects to the
instant one, has already held that the doctrine of waiver
is not herf' applicable.
In the Jones case-, the poliC)' stated that before it
would be in pffect it must he delivered, the premium
paid and the applicant must not liavc cons1lltcd or been
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treafrd b.1J a phys icia 11 smcc 7z is medical examinatio It.
After taking th(' insuranct> medical Pxamination, thP
applicant contracted spinal meningitis for whieh ht' was
treated by a ph.'·sician and from which he subsequently
di<>d. The premium had been paid and the agent had
delivered tlw policy Pven though he knew of the applicant's subsequent treatment b.'· a ph.'·sician. The plaintiff tried to claim the delivery constituted a waiver of
the relevant condition. This court held that the doctrine
of waiver was not there applicable, stating that thP th0ory
of wain r nPcPssairly prPsupposl'd in that instance thP
existence of a valid contract and that since there was
no contract there was no waiver of the contract terms.
1

For the reasons sc->t out above, it must be concludPd
that under the circumstances of the instant case, mere
delivery of a certificate of insurance was not a waiver
of either the stated effective date or the requirement
that the premium be paid prior to or on the c->ffective date.

CONCLUSTOX
Tlw law and the undisputed facts as set forth ahovP
unequivocall.'· d(·monstrate that the provisions of tlw
polic.'· were clear and not ambiguous, that these provisions Wt'I'P within the parties' powPr to agree to, that
tlw provisions are lawful and not to bP reformed by any
eonrt, that the conditions prerPqnisite to the policy taking
effact had been nt-ither satisfi<>d nor waived and conseqn!:'ntl.'·, tht> applicant's lifr was not insnrPd by the defendant at tht> time of his untinwly and nnfortunat('
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dvath. For tht>se l'Pasons, tlw District Conrt's judgment
:-;hould lw affirnwd.

HA TED this ____________________ da.v of ________________________ , 1969.
Resrwctfull)' submitted,

JONES, vVALDO, H OLBROOK &.McDONOUGH

By ___________________________________________________ _
vV. Robert ~Wright
By ___________________________________________________ _
G. Randall Klimt
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